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A simplified credit risk model for 






Currently, the mainstream methodologies that are most widely used to measure credit risk can be 
divided into two broad categories: mark to market models and default models. The differences 
between these paradigms rest first on the scope of the losses considered. Whereas in default models 
an obligor can be in only one of two states, default and non-default, so that losses are exclusively 
those resulting from debtor defaults, mark to market models also consider losses resulting from a 
change of value of the loans due to credit quality migration. Further differences arise from the 
functional forms assumed for the underlying probability distributions, and the way in which these are 
related to obtain the loan portfolio’s loss distribution. For example,
4 in CreditMetrics
TM, which is a mark 
to market methodology, the key component is the transition matrix related to a rating system, which 
provides the probabilistic mechanism that models the quality migration of loans. This determines the 
losses due to obligor defaults, and the changes in the market value of the loans in the portfolio due to 
quality migration through a Monte Carlo simulation process, to finally obtain the loss distribution for the 
portfolio. Whereas the transition matrix, the changes of value, the loss-given-default of the loans, and 
the migration covariances are theoretically estimated from statistical data and market information, the 
simulation process relies heavily on a normality assumption around the transition probabilities and 
Merton’s
5 asset value model to establish a relation between credit quality and asset value of the 
debtor firms, and to determine the joint migration behaviour of the loans in the portfolio. 
KMV’s
6 methodology is also based on Merton’s model
7 and defines a distance to default, which is the 
difference between the value of a company’s assets and a certain liability threshold, such that if this 
quantity is negative, the company is bankrupt and will therefore default on its obligations. For 
standardisation purposes, this distance to default is measured as a multiple of the standard deviation 
of the value of the firm’s assets. KMV has accumulated a large database, which it uses to estimate 
default probabilities and correlations, as well as the loss distributions due to debtor default and quality 
migration. For a specific company, this probability is approximated by the expected default 
frequencies, ie the ratio of the number of companies with the same distance to default that actually 
defaulted to the total number of companies with the same distance to default in the database. Being a 
mark to market methodology, it differs significantly from CreditMetrics
TM in that it relies on EDFs for 
each debtor rather than average transition rates as estimated from the historical data produced by the 
rating agencies. There are also considerable differences in the assumptions and the functional forms 
utilised. 
CreditRisk
+ is a default model
8 in which the cornerstone of the methodology is the set of individual 
default probabilities of the loans in the portfolio. A basic assumption is that the default probabilities are 
                                                       
1  An earlier version of this model was published in English in Economia, Societa’ e Istituzioni. See Márquez (2002). The 
model presented here is an updated version with significant differences compared with the original and several new results. 
2   Bank of Mexico. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Mexico. 
3  A good detailed review of the different approaches is presented by Crouhy et al (2000). 
4 CreditMetrics
TM is a spin-off from the JP Morgan Risk Management systems development group. 
5  The reader unfamiliar with the methodology is referred to Section 8 of the CreditMetrics
TM technical document and Merton 
(1974). 
6  This is the proprietary methodology of KMV corporation. 
7  See Kealhofer (1998, 1999). 
8 CreditRisk
+ is marketed by Credit Suisse Financial Products.  
BIS Papers No 22  329
 
always small, so that the number of defaults in the portfolio can be approximated according to a 
Poisson probability distribution. In its more general version, where default probabilities can change 
over time, it is further assumed that these probabilities are entirely driven by a weighted sum of K risk 
factors, each distributed according to an independent Gamma distribution. The weights of the risk 
factors differ depending on the individual rating of the obligor and, conditional on these risk factors, 
individual obligor defaults are assumed to be independent Bernoulli trials. In the general case, default 
correlation is implicit in the covariation behaviour of the risk factors, and the Poisson assumption leads 
to a negative binomial for the distribution of the number of defaults. Having obtained the distribution of 
the number of defaults in the portfolio, proceeding in the typical actuarial fashion by selecting a unit of 
loss and given the recovery rates for the individual loans, these are then grouped into buckets of equal 
loss-given-default, and the probability generating function of the loss distribution is obtained. From 
here it is necessary to resort to a numerical recursion procedure to obtain the loss distribution. 
Another popular default methodology is Credit Portfolio View,
9 which is a discrete multiperiod model. 
Apart from the fact that it is conceived from the beginning as a dynamic model, the highlight of the 
methodology is the determination of default probabilities, which are logit functions of indices of 
macroeconomic variables. The portfolio is segmented according to geographical location and 
economic activity of the debtors, and the indices for each segment are linear functions of the 
associated macroeconomic variables for the segment. In turn, each macroeconomic variable is 
assumed to obey a second-order univariate, autoregressive process, and due to cross-correlations in 
the error terms of the linear models for the indices and the autoregressive expressions of the 
underlying macroeconomic variables, the parameters of both are estimated simultaneously from a 
system of equations. Credit Portfolio View also resorts to simulation on transition matrices to obtain 
the loss distribution. 
All of the above methodologies have contributed greatly to the understanding of the key issues in 
credit risk modelling and it is now accepted that all models are converging to produce comparable 
results. Research by Finger (1998), Crouhy et al (2000) and Gordy (2000) discusses how under 
certain parametric equivalents the mainstream methodologies such as CreditMetrics
TM and CreditRisk
+ 
can be mapped into each other. It is important to note that the emphasis in all of these methodologies 
is on producing a distribution of losses which is as realistic as possible. Although one can hardly argue 
against this principle, the computational effort required can be impractical for certain users, such as 
regulators, who have to oversee the whole financial system and not just one individual bank. 
Furthermore, the development of management tools such as simple rules for establishing capital 
adequacy, identifying segments of excessive credit risk concentration and setting single obligor limits 
to loans that are explicitly related to the risk profile of the portfolio is not directly addressed. 
The model presented here assumes that the default probabilities of the loans and their covariances 
are given. From here, a default model is developed which obtains an explicit functional form for the 
loss distribution, assuming that it can be characterised by two parameters: the mean and the variance. 
Given a specific mean-variance distribution of losses, not necessarily normal, it is possible to obtain 
the value-at-risk (VaR) for the portfolio as the expected loss plus a certain multiple of the standard 
deviation of losses. This leads to a lower bound on the bank’s capitalisation ratio and the resulting 
inequality establishes capital adequacy. The model is developed in a way which explicitly measures 
the concentration of the loan portfolio. We can see that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index emerges 
naturally as a measure of concentration, providing a precise quantification of how concentration 
contributes to the overall credit risk of the portfolio. Two new properties of the index are obtained that 
relate single obligor limits to concentration along different segments of the portfolio so as to ensure 
capital adequacy. Furthermore, the research shows how correlation affects concentration and this 
leads to the definition of a risk concentration measure. Finally, it is shown that the model can be 
implemented with limited information on the actual composition of bank loan portfolios, which is a 
crucial factor for regulators inasmuch as their capacity to obtain up to date and timely information from 
banks is limited. 
Examples of numerical exercises performed to date on real loan portfolios are shown, and are seen to 
provide results comparable to those obtained using other methodologies, at a considerable reduction 
in computational effort. Finally, since all the relevant elements for measuring default credit risk are 
                                                       
9  This product is offered by McKinsey, the consulting firm. The classic reference is Wilson (1997a,b).  
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explicitly parameterised, the shortcomings of available information can be compensated by a judicious 
use of assumptions on the values of the relevant parameters. The computational efficiency of the 
model results in rapid feedback on the implications and sensitivity of the risk profile of a loan portfolio 
to changes in the parameters.
10 Since the measurement of concentration is at the heart of the model, 
we begin with a discussion of this topic. 
2. The  concentration  issue 
Loan concentration has long been identified as an important source of risk for banks and loan 
portfolios. Judging from current technical literature on credit risk, as far as concentration goes the 
establishment of a generally accepted paradigm has remained elusive in spite of the importance of the 
problem.
11 The more formal approaches, which look to portfolio theory,
12 have been mainly concerned 
with optimal diversification of portfolios of traded fixed income assets where information compatible 
with traditional Markowitz (1959) type models can be obtained in a cost-effective manner. It must be 
pointed out however, that traditional portfolio theory approaches deal with the concentration issue 
indirectly, since the preoccupation is the allocation of assets through the well known mean-variance 
trade-off, but a clear measure of concentration and its relation to risk has never been made explicit. 
Kealhofer (1998) has an interesting discussion of the issue from the point of view of diversification. 
First he states that “there has been no method for actually measuring the amount of diversification in a 
debt portfolio”, and that “ex ante, no method has existed which could quantify concentrations”; 
concentrations have only been detected ex post. He then argues that “measuring the diversification of 
a portfolio means specifying the range and likelihood of possible losses associated with the portfolio”. 
He goes on to provide a definition that allows the comparison of diversification of two portfolios as: 
“Portfolio A is better diversified than portfolio B if the probability of loss exceeding a given 
percent is smaller for A than for B, and both portfolios have the same expected loss”. 
Thus, when dealing with portfolios of traditional bank loans, no formal methodology for measuring 
concentration seems to have emerged. As pointed out by Altman and Saunders (1998), the 
concentration measurement issue has mainly been dealt with through subjective analysis. Typically, 
banks and other agents apply a scoring technique based on the opinion of a group of experts about 
the degree of concentration observed along and across different segments of a portfolio, as regards 
some classification criterion, in order to obtain an indicator of loan concentration. Generally, the 
number obtained is of more value in cardinal or hierarchical terms than it is as a direct measure of risk 
that can quickly be translated into potential losses or value-at-risk.
13 
The approach adopted in the following analysis does not solve all the aforementioned problems, but it 
does provide a theoretical framework that might allow, ex ante, the detection of risk concentration. The 
proposed risk concentration measure is consistent with Kealhofer’s notion as previously stated. 
Example 6.2 illustrates how the risk concentration measure can be used to detect the more risky 
segments of a loan portfolio. 
3.  Value-at-risk, concentration and the “single obligor limit”: the simplest 
case 
Traditionally, banks deal with concentration risk by placing a limit on the maximum amount that can be 
loaned to a single debtor, along the different dimensions where concentration can occur, ie industry, 
geographical region, product, country, etc. Normally, the “single obligor limit” is expressed as a 
                                                       
10  Due to the closed form expression for value-at-risk, it is also possible to perform analytical exercises. 
11  See Caouette et al (1998), Chapters 17 and 18. See also Kealhofer (1998). 
12  See, for example, Bennet (1984). 
13  See, for example, Moody’s Investor Services (1991) and the Coopers and Lybrand (1993) report.  
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proportion δ of the capital K of the bank. However, when discussing loan concentration, one normally 
addresses the issue of how much of the total loans outstanding is concentrated in an individual or 
group. Thus, whatever the virtues of setting limits as a percentage of capital, this does not give much 
information as to the actual concentration of loans in the portfolio. To see this, note that, at least 
theoretically, a bank could have only one loan that respects the limit but have a totally concentrated 
portfolio. On the other hand, the bank can have a million uncorrelated loans of exactly the same size, 
in which case the portfolio would be completely diversified, regardless of whether each loan respects 
the limit or not. Thus, one can have highly concentrated portfolios as well as highly diversified 
portfolios that respect the constraint in terms of capital.
14 We will therefore part with tradition, since for 
the purpose at hand it is better to think of concentration in terms of proportions of the total value of the 
loan portfolio, and fix limits accordingly. Throughout this paper, individual limits on loans will be 
expressed as proportions θ of the total value of the loan portfolio V. Furthermore, no generality is lost 
since δ and θ are linearly related, so the results are not altered. To see this, let fk denote the value of 
the kth of N loans, and analyse the single obligor limit as represented by the following constraint: 
; V V V
V
K




= ψ  is the capitalisation ratio. Thus, θ = δψ,
15 and the single obligor limit will be expressed 
as: 
fk ≤ θV  k =1,2,…,N 
If all loans have the same default probability p, and assuming independence, one can define N binary 
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For the moment, assume that it can be approximated by the normal distribution,
16 so that: 
∑
=
α α α − + = σ + µ =
N
i
i f p p z pV z VAR
1
2 ) 1 (  (3.2) 
If VARα ≤ K, after a little algebra one arrives at the following expression: 
                                                       
14  For example, if loans are constrained not to exceed 12% of capital, this can be done with only one loan in the portfolio, in 
which case concentration is maximum. On the other hand, if the portfolio has a thousand loans all representing 12% of 
capital, it would be a highly diversified portfolio. 
15  Note that if there is only one loan in the portfolio, then it is necessarily true that fi = V so that ψδ = θ = 1, which in turn implies 
that the portfolio is totally concentrated in one loan. 
16  See, for example, DeGroot (1988, p 263).  
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F H ion Concentrat  
Readers familiar with the literature of industrial organisation will have recognised that the above 
measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index.
17 
4.  Analysis of the capital adequacy inequality 
The first observation is that, with the obvious limitations, it seems that portfolio concentration risk can 
be managed using a very general measure of concentration other than the single obligor limit. Next, it 
is interesting to note that capital adequacy as represented by the capitalisation ratio ψ requires that 
) ( ) 1 ( F H p p z p − + ≥ ψ α  (4.1) 
This inequality relates capital adequacy to the probability of default, the confidence level used for 
value-at-risk, and the concentration index. It also shows that there is a direct relation between the 
Herfindahl index and the variance of losses. Since the index takes on values between the reciprocal of 
the number of loans N and one, where high concentration is present the variance of losses will vary 
between  N p p / ) 1 ( −  and  ) 1 ( p p − , depending on H(F). Furthermore, note that the role played by 
H(F) in the above is totally consistent with Kealhofer’s definition of concentration since it is obvious 
from (4.1) that the lower the value of H(F), the lower the probability of loss exceeding a specified level, 
for the same expected loss. 
In what follows, we can see that everything behaves as it should. The following theorem summarises 
the main implications for risk managers of the previous analysis. These results are introduced early 
because they remain basically unchanged throughout all future generalisations. 
Theorem 4.1 
The bound Θ(p,ψ,α) on the concentration measure has the following properties: 
Θ(p,ψ,α) varies in direct proportion to the capitalisation ratio ψ and inversely to the default  
probability p and the value-at-risk confidence level zα. 
If the concentration measure exceeds the bound (ie H(F) > Θ(p,ψ,α)), then the capital of the bank is at 
risk for the given confidence level. 
If the default probability p exceeds the capitalisation ratio ψ, then the capital of the bank is at risk for 
any confidence level, regardless of the concentration of the loan portfolio. 
If Θ(p,ψ,α) >1, no degree of concentration of the loan portfolio places the capital of the bank at risk. 
                                                       
17  See, for example, Shy (1995) or Tirole (1995).  
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Proof 
Point one is obvious from the form of Θ(p,ψ,α. The second point is easily verified, ie: if H(F) > Θ(p,ψ,α) 
then, 













+ = Θ + > θ + =
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Point three follows directly from 4.1: 
VARα ≤ K⇔ ()) ( 1 F H p p z p − + ≥ ψ α  
Point three is also verified easily. If p > ψ, then 4.1 is violated: 
( ) ( ) K pq F H V z K V pq F H z V pq F H z p VAR > + = + ψ > + = α α α α ) ( ) ( ) (  
As for point four, it is well known that H(F) ≤ 1 for any arbitrary F.
18 
Capital adequacy Theorem 4.1 provides some useful rules for the risk manager and for the regulator. 
First, one can determine capital adequacy because one obtains precise measures of the adjustments 
in the capitalisation ratio required by variations in the default rates and/or the concentration of the loan 
portfolio. Furthermore, depending on the amount of control that banks have on the default ratio and 
loan concentration, adjustments in the default probability and the concentration of the loan portfolio 
necessary to maintain capital adequacy can also be calculated. Thus, if the concentration of the loan 
portfolio exceeds the bound at the desired confidence level, inequality (3.2) provides a convenient 
means of fine-tuning the adjustments required in ψ, p and H(F) so that credit risk does not place the 
capital of the bank in jeopardy. Also interesting is that if the default rate of the portfolio exceeds the 
capitalisation ratio, the risk manager and the financial authorities are alerted that the banks’ capital is 
at risk regardless of the concentration of the loan portfolio and the confidence level adopted. 
5.  A closer look at the Herfindahl index 
One of the main features of the approach taken is that a measure of loan concentration as it relates to 
risk arises naturally. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) has been extensively studied in relation to 
industrial concentration, and it is known to have several important properties. Thus, it is known that the 
index takes values between the reciprocal of N and one,
19 and that it behaves well in terms of “the five 
properties of inequality measures”.
20 We now investigate how the HHI relates to the intuitive notion 
that concentration is related to the minimum number of obligors where credit is more concentrated. A 
better understanding of the relation between the single obligor limit and the concentration index has 
important risk management and regulatory implications. 
In order to examine how concentration relates to the notion that more credit in fewer hands means 
more concentration, it must be consistent with the notion that maximum concentration occurs when all 
credit is held by a single obligor and the minimum is when all debtors owe the same amount. Formally: 








;   for 0




   j =1,2,…,N 
                                                       
18  See Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980). 













20  See Cowell (1995) and Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980).  
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N is the ith unit vector. 
b.  The minimum concentration occurs when 
N
V
fi =  for i =1,2,…,N 
Concentration has to do with numbers, and the HHI has several interesting numbers-related 
properties. The best known is Adelman’s “numbers-equivalent”,
21 which for loan concentration states 
that its inverse can be interpreted as “the minimum number of loans of equal size that would result in a 
specific value of the index”. It is now shown that the value of the index is maximised under the single 
obligor limit, when all credit is concentrated in the minimum number of obligors, and each obligor holds 
credit up to the limit. The theorem establishes the relation between the single obligor limit and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman measure of concentration, and in so doing, it shows that Adelman’s numbers-
equivalent is in fact the maximum concentration possible, when loans are constrained by a certain 
limit.
22 In what follows, we let F denote the vector of loans fk ≥ 0  for  k =1,2,…,N. Without loss of 
generality, we also assume that the elements of this vector have been sorted in decreasing order: 
f1 ≥ f2 ≥ … ≥ fN 







1. The following proposition is an important basic property of the 
index. 
Proposition 5.1 
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has the property H(F″) < H(F). 
Proof 
To prove (a), simply note that: 
() [] [] 0 ) ( 2 ) ( ) (
1





k k f f f f F H F H  
The Proof of (b) is similar: H(F″) – H(F) = 2ε⎣(fi – fj) – ε⎦≤ 0 since ε ≤ (fi – fj) 
(note that ε > fi – fj implies case (a)). 
                                                       
21  See Adelman (1969) and Kelly Jr (1981). For other interesting numbers-related properties, see Weinstock (1984). 
22  Although the result conforms to intuition, no formal proof has been detected by the authors in the more frequent references, 
such as Sleuwaegen et al (1989), Weinstock or Encaoua and Jaquemin op cit.  
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The proposition states that if some element fk is increased at the expense of decreasing a smaller 
element fj, the concentration index will increase. If on the other hand, an element is increased at the 
expense of a larger element, then the concentration index will decrease. To continue with the analysis, 
it is now shown that if all credit is concentrated in the minimum number of debtors, while subject to the 
constraint fk ≤ θV, then H(F) ≤ θ. 
Proposition 5.2 
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we have that H(F) ≤ θ. 
Proof 
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2 – 2nθ + 1 
For H(F) = θ one must solve the quadratic equation, 
(n + 1)nθ
2 – 2nθ + 1 = θ   ie   n(n + 1)θ
2 – (1 + 2n)θ + 1 = 0  (5.1) 
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Substituting θ(λ) in the left-hand side of (5.1), one obtains: 
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It is now shown that if all loans respect the single obligor limit fk ≤ θV, then H(F) ≤ θ and the 
distribution of loans of the previous proposition maximises the value of the index under the single 
obligor constraint. 
Theorem 5.3 
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with θ, ε ≥ 0; ε < θ and ∑fk = 1. Then F maximises H(F) for all F such that fk ≤ θ ∀ k and H(F) ≤ θ. 
Proof
23 












 in order to have ∑fk =  1. Furthermore, any vector with  k f′ = θ + δ; δ >  0 would violate the 
constraint fk ≤ θ ∀ k. Therefore, the only possibility of altering the distribution of loans would be to 
decrease some element fk = θ or fn+1 = ε by some quantity δ > 0. But then proposition 5.1(b) states that 
H(F′) < H(F) ≤ θ. 
This result has important implications for risk management and regulation since de facto it states that 
by placing a limit on individual loans as a propotion of the value of the portfolio, one is also placing a 
limit on concentration as measured by the HHI by the same amount θ. Therefore, it is simple to check 
for capital adequacy by 
()
()













Alternatively, from (4.1), one can obtain the capital adequacy relation in terms of the single obligor limit 
(2.6), that is: 
θ − + ≥ ψ α ) 1 ( p p z p   (5.3) 
Thus, (5.2) provides a very simple means to check for capital adequacy, without performing 
complicated calculations. Although crude, simply take θ to be the ratio of the largest loan to the total 
value of the loan portfolio and the observed default rate as an ex post proxy of default probability and 
substitute these values in the right-hand side of (5.1). Since Theorem (5.1) guarantees H(F) ≤ θ, if the 
inequality holds it is a good sign that the bank is adequately capitalised. 
It should be realised however, that this condition is sufficient but not necessary. As will be shown in 
the following theorem, if one chooses to explicitly constrain the portfolio to satisfy H(F) ≤ θ, it is 
possible to have specific loans that as a proportion of the total value of the portfolio represent a 
quantity larger than θ. Intuitively, granting a very large loan while satisfying the constraint on the index 
is only possible at the expense of the other loans in the portfolio so that in the optimum, the portfolio is 
composed only of one large loan and all others are small and of equal size. 
Theorem 5.4 
If H(F) ≤ θ then: 




fi    for i = 1,2,3,…,N 
Proof 
The idea behind the proof is that under the constraint H(F) ≤ θ, a very large loan is only possible at the 
expense of all the other loans, which must become progressively smaller and of equal size. So, given 
the constraint H(F) ≤ θ, let us maximise the largest element f1. Suppose f1 = a is the largest loan 
possible, then necessarily f2 = f3 = … = fN = b; for some b > 0; b < a. To see this, consider any other 
distribution with fi > fj and 1  < i < j. Then there exists ε > 0  such  that  fi′ = fi − ε > fj′ = fj  + ε > 0. 
Proposition 5.1 then states that H(F′) < H(F) ≤ θ. Now, by continuity of the index on each fi and 
                                                       
23  This proof and the one for the next theorem are different from the original proofs in Márquez (2002). They are due to Fausto 
Membrillo and are more intuitive and elegant than the original.  
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because of Theorem 5.3, there exists ε′ > 0 such that any loan distribution F″ with  ε′ + = ′ ′ 1 1 f f  and 
0 ≥ ε′ − ′ = ′ ′
j j f f  satisfies H(F′) < H(F″) ≤ θ, which contradicts the assumption that F is a distribution 
where f1 is a maximum. Therefore, if f1 = a, for some a > 0, the loan distribution which maximises f1, 











fk , 3, …,N 
and a > b; therefore: 
H(F) = a
2 + (N – 1)b
2 ≤ θ (5.4) 









Substituting b in (5.4) one obtains: 
















N a  
This leads to the following quadratic equation: 
Na
2 – 2a + ⎣1 – θ(N – 1)⎦ ≤ 0  (5.5) 
Equating to zero, the solution of (5.5), yields: 
() ( ) [] 1 1 1
1
− − θ + = N N
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a  
Note that  θ → a  when N → ∞, and it is simple to obtain the last inequality: 
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Having a good concentration index is desirable from the regulatory point of view, since it facilitates 
comparisons of loan concentration between different institutions, and leads to an assessment of 
concentration risk for the financial system as a whole. For the risk manager of an individual bank, 
besides measuring his own risk, it provides benchmarks for setting business strategy and goals, and 
allows comparisons with the competition. The HHI seems particularly well suited for the task, since 
besides measuring concentration it is directly related to risk, and provides a quick means to check 
capital adequacy. In the following section it will be seen that the concept is robust under much more 
general conditions. 
5.1 A  numerical  example 
In order to illustrate the results obtained so far, consider the following example taken from the 
CreditRisk
+ manual:  






A    B C D E F G 
Total 
1  $4,728 $5,528 $3,138 $5,320 $1,800  $1,933  $358  $22,805 
2  $7,728 $5,848 $3,204 $5,765 $5,042 $2,317  $1,090 $30,994 
3      $4,831 $20,239 $15,411 $2,411  $2,652 $45,544 
4     $4,912    $2,598  $4,929  $12,439 
5     $5,435      $6,467  $11,902 
6          $6,480  $6,480 
Total $12,456  $11,376  $21,520  $31,324 $22,253  $9,259  $21,976  $130,164 
 
Default probabilities for the loans are taken from the following table: 
 
Table 5.2 









For this first example let the default probability for the loans be the weighted average of the 
probabilities of Table 5.2; that is 10.89%. The HHI for the portfolio is 6.61%. Assuming normality and 
choosing a 5% confidence level, zα = 1.96 and one obtains: 
2658 . 0 0661 . 0 8911 . 0 1089 . 0 96 . 1 1089 . 0 ) ( ) 1 ( = × × + = − + ≥ ψ α F H p p z p  
Then the bank’s economic capital must be at least: 
VaR0.05 = 0.2658 × V = 0.2658 × $130,164.00 = $34,602.79 








Since 0.2689  >  0.2658, the bank exhibits capital adequacy. Now, under 3.2, the maximum 
concentration that the portfolio can assume is: 
0687 . 0
8911 . 0 1089 . 0 96 . 1













α p p z
p
 
Since H(F) = 6.61%, the portfolio is not excessively concentrated.  
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Since the maximum value of the index is 6.87%, no loan in the portfolio should exceed: 
f * 88 . 107 , 34 164 , 130 2621 . 0 0687 . 0 = × = × = V  
Table 5.1 shows that the largest loan is the $20,239 D-loan, which is smaller than the aforementioned 
amount. It is interesting to note that the single obligor limit would be violated. According to Theorem 
5.2, loans should not exceed: 
fi ≤ 0.0687 × 130,164 = $8,942.27 
There are two loans in the portfolio that are greater than this amount: the $20,239 D-loan and the 
$15,411 E-loan, confirming that the condition is sufficient but not necessary. Finally, we can see that 
the largest loan in the portfolio is within the bounds provided by Theorem 5.2, ie $8,942.27 ≤ $20,239 
≤ $34,107.88. 
6.  Accounting for default correlation and different default probabilities 
The results obtained so far rely on the following assumptions: 
a.  The loss distribution can be characterised by its mean and variance. 
b.  Default probabilities are homogeneous and independent from each other, for all loans along 
the dimension where loan concentration can occur. 
c.  There is only one dimension of possible loan concentration. 
d.  Nothing is recovered from defaulting loans. 
In this section the model is generalised by relaxing the second and third assumptions. We first 
examine the case where default probabilities can be different and are correlated. 
6.1  A general model 
Assume that the portfolio loss distribution can be characterised by its mean and its variance and that 
the vector of default probabilities π and the covariance matrix M are given exogenously. Proceeding 
along the same lines of the previous analysis, the VaR to capital inequality is now: 
K MF F z F VAR
T T ≤ + π = α α   (6.1) 
Since M is positive definite, it is well known that there exists a matrix Q such that, 
M = QΛQ
T  (6.2) 
where Λ is the diagonal matrix of characteristic values of M, and Q is an orthogonal matrix of the 
eigenvectors of M, with the property that Q
–1 = Q
T.
24 Let  ,
T Q Q S Λ =  where  Λ  is the diagonal 
matrix of the square roots of the eigenvalues of M, so that M = S
TS. Now change the variable to 
G = SF so that F
TMF = G
TG. This change of variable effectively rescales F in terms of the matrix S 
which in turn is representative of the “square root” of the covariance matrix M. It is well known that this 
is equivalent to rescaling the loans in the portfolio according to the covariances of the default 
probabilities between the loans, so that loans with higher loss covariances will increase in size, while 
the opposite will happen to loans with smaller loss covariances. Although much credit in few hands is 
potentially dangerous, it is even more dangerous when too much risk is concentrated in a particular 
group of debtors, as suggested by the rescaling of the loan portfolio in terms of S. Thus, at a given 
moment a numerically highly diversified portfolio of small loans that exhibit large variances and are 
highly correlated may be riskier than a numerically small portfolio of large loans that are uncorrelated 
and have low default probabilities. In the next section, the discussion is taken a step further. 
                                                       
24  Any intermediate text on matrix theory can be consulted. See, for example, Strang (1988), or Mirsky (1990).  
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To continue with the development of the model, multiplying and dividing F
TMF by F
TF, and dividing by 
V = 1
TF, the following capital adequacy relation, relative to the value of the loan portfolio, is obtained: 













2  = R(F,M) = Rayleigh’s quotient  (6.4) 





=   (6.5) 
is the expected loss of the portfolio relative to its value which is nothing more than the weighted 
average of default probabilities. Proceeding in the usual way, and applying Theorem 5.1, one obtains 
a limit on concentration and single obligor limits as: 
2











F H   (6.6) 
Note that relations (6.3) and (6.6) have the same structure as those obtained for the simple cases of 
equal default probabilities and independent loans. In this general case, Rayleigh’s quotient measures 
the variance of losses. One can verify that this reduces to the case of equal default probabilities for all 
loans and uncorrelated defaults, and that all the results of Theorem 4.1 are still true under this 
generalisation. 
Note that the total variance of losses  ) (F H σ  is decomposed into the variation-covariation effect, 
represented by σ, and concentration H(F). This emphasises the fact that resizing the loan vector 
through the covariance matrix M implies that concentration in the number of loans is not necessarily a 
good measure of risk concentration. 
6.2  A measure of risk concentration 
In order to investigate how correlation affects concentration and increases risk, consider the special 
case when all loans have the same default probability p and each pair of loans is similarly correlated 
through ρ. Then, the covariance of defaults between any two loans (i, j) is: 
σij = σiσjρij = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( j j i i p p p p − − ρij = p(1 – p)ρ   ∀ i, j (6.7) 


























p p M  (6.8) 
It is convenient to represent this as: 
M = p(1 – p){ρ11
T + (1 – ρ)l}, (6.9) 
“1” is the “sum vector” ie 1
T= (1,1,1,...,1) and “l” is the identity matrix.   
Thus, the variance of losses of the portfolio is: 
F
TMF = p(1 – p){ρ(1
TF)
2 + (1 – ρ)F
TF} 
Proceeding in the usual way, and noting that V = 1
TF, this leads to a VaR of: 
{ } ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( F H p p z p V VaR ρ − + ρ − ⋅ + = α  (6.10)  
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In this expression, loss variance is decomposed into two distinct elements. The first is the Bernoulli 
variance p(1 – p), while concentration is captured by: 
H′ = ρ + (1 – ρ)H(F)  (6.11) 
Note that under positive correlation, H′ can be interpreted as a convex combination between the HHI 
of a totally concentrated portfolio (H(.) = 1) and the HHI of the portfolio H(F). Clearly, H′ increases with 
ρ and for ρ = 0 we have H′ = H(F); whereas H′ = 1 if ρ = 1. In other words, if all the loans of a portfolio 
are perfectly and positively correlated, in terms of risk they behave as a single loan. In general, one 
can say that the correlated portfolio behaves exactly the same as an uncorrelated portfolio, whose 
concentration index is H′, instead of H(F). Thus, H′ could be considered a correlation-adjusted 
concentration index. 
Furthermore, (6.11) can be used to compute such an index for any given portfolio by computing p and 
ρ such that: 






= , solving for ρ gives: 
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[] ) ( 1 ) 1 (
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= ρ  (6.13) 
The expression provides an equivalent correlation measure which summarises how loan defaults are 
pairwise correlated within the portfolio. 
Example 6.1 
Consider the loan portfolio of the previous examples. The correlation matrix used in this exercise is as 












3 2 , 3 1 , 3
3 , 2 2 1 , 2





Assuming normality and a 5% confidence level, VaR is: 
$55,683    6) 1.96(21,17 14,179
05 . 0 05 . 0 = + = + π = MF F z F VaR T T  
From previous examples we know that p = 0.1089, H(F) = 0.0661, and computation yields: 






Thus, capital adequacy requires: 
  0.4278 ) (   = σ + > ψ α F H z p  
Assume K = $60,000, so that  . 4610 . 0
164 , 130
000 , 60
= = ψ  Relation (1.5) provides single obligor limits: 
0805 . 0
) 6329 . 0 ( 96 . 1





















fi ≤ 0.0805 × $130,164 = $10,482  
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From Table 5.1 we can see that there are only two loans that exceed the limit.  
Let us now examine the impact of correlation on concentration. From (6.13): 
2191 . 0
] 0661 . 0 1 [ 0978 . 0




= ρ  
From (6.11), the risk concentration index is: 
H′ = 0.2191 + (1 – 0.2191) × 0.0661 = 0.2707 
Beside the fact that the portfolio of this example is a pretty bad one, if one adds 22% correlation to the 
high default probability of 10.89% one obtains unexpected losses of  , 1627 . 0 ) ( = σ F H  as opposed to 
0801 . 0 ) ( ) 1 ( = − F H p p  if the loans were independent. Thus, the 22% equivalent correlation doubles 
the standard deviation of losses over the uncorrelated case. It is also interesting to compare the risk 
concentration index of H′ = 27.07%, which is four times greater than H(F) = 6.61%. In terms of capital 
adequacy, the correlated portfolio requires a capitalisation ratio ψ ≥ 43%, which is substantially greater 
than the 27% required if the loans were independent. 
6.3  Dealing with different dimensions of concentration 
Generally, banks partition loan portfolios into subportfolios or “buckets” according to some practical 
criterion which is somehow related to the way in which they do business. For the purpose of credit risk 
in general and concentration in particular, it may be desirable to adopt a different criterion. As 
mentioned initially, one of the most difficult problems is to determine ex ante potentially dangerous 
dimensions of concentration, and these may have nothing to do with the organisational structure of the 
bank. The model permits a totally arbitrary segmentation of the portfolio, in order to determine the 
segments where concentration is potentially riskier. This permits the differentiation of limits for each 
segment, as well as differentiation in the allocation of capital. 
6.3.1  The analysis of individual segments 
Suppose that F is arbitrarily partitioned into h segments, F
T = (F1,…,Fh), where Fi is a vector whose 
elements are the amounts outstanding of the loans in group i. Now partition the default probability 
vector and the associated covariance matrix accordingly: 
a.  π = (πi); where π″ is the vector of default probabilities of segment i; i = 1,2,3,…,h 






























Each diagonal block Mi is the covariance matrix of defaults for the loans in segment i and has 
dimension (Ni × Ni), where Ni is the number of loans in the segment. Matrices Cij contain the 
covariances of the defaults between the loans of segments i and j. Let Vi =∑
∈ i F j
j f  be the value of the 







 Let Ki = γiK, where γi is the proportion of capital allocated to 
segment i;  ∑
=





1 ; ] 1 , 0 [ . Note that when analysing individual segments, only correlations 
between defaults of the loans in segment i with loans of the other groups should be considered, while 
correlations of other groups between themselves are irrelevant. Thus, from M construct matrices Si 
with the following structure:  
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S   (6.14) 
Note that ∑iSi = M. When integrating the analysis of individual segments into the overall portfolio, it is 
important that the relative weights of each segment in the overall portfolio do not distort the results for 
the portfolio as a whole. An additivity property is necessary so that addition of over individual 











  (6.15) 
In what follows, we will see that this constant permits the summation of the individual VaRi. 
Proceeding in the usual way, the value-at-risk inequality for each segment is: 




i i γ = ≤ φ + π = ν α    for i = 1, 2,…, h (6.16) 
where γi ≥ 0 and ∑iγi = 1. It is easily verified that  . MF F z F VaR
T T
i i α α + π = = ν ∑  
Dividing by Vi, leads to capital adequacy for each individual segment: 
{} ∑
≠
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Cij Fj (6.18) 
where 
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= = σ  (6.19) 
























Cij Fj (6.20) 
It is interesting to note that the bound on concentration now includes a correction for default 
correlation with the loans in other groups: namely, the second term on the right-hand side of the 
inequality. This conforms to intuition, since higher correlation of defaults with the loans in the other 
groups means that less concentration can be tolerated in group i, namely: 
{} ∑








Cij Fj  (6.21) 
6.3.2  Overall capital adequacy in a segmented portfolio 
Note that all of the above expressions are obtained from νi/Vi, so that the weight of the segments 
within the portfolio is not accounted for. Therefore, a simple summation of terms can be misleading as 
to the overall capital adequacy of the segmented portfolio. Letting γi =
V
Vi , then if 6.17 is satisfied for 
all the segments,  ∑
=





 ensures capital adequacy for the portfolio.  
344  BIS Papers No 22
 
Example 6.2 
Refer to the portfolio of the previous examples. The partition is shown in Table 6.1.
25 The loans vector 
is partitioned as: F
T = (F1  F2  F3), 
 
Table 6.1 
Rating  F1  Rating  F2  Rating  F3 
A1 $4,728  B1 $5,528  A2 $7,728 
C2 $3,204  C1 $3,138  B2 $5,848 
C4 $4,912  C3 $4,831  C5 $5,435 
D1 $5,320  E2 $5,042  D2 $5,765 
D3 $20,239 E3 $15,411 E1  $1,800 
F1 $1,933  F3 $2,411  F2 $2,317 
F4  $2,598 G1  $358 G3  $2,652 
G2 $1,090  G5 $6,467  G4 $4,929 
      G6  $6,480 
Total $44,024 Total $43,186 Total $42,954 
 
Next, the default probabilities vector and the covariance matrix are partitioned to be consistent with the 
partition of the loans vector as: 
π












3 2 3 1 3
3 2 2 1 2









●  M1, M2, and M3 are the idiosyncratic covariance matrices for the three groups respectively. 
● 
T C12  = C21 is the covariance matrix between the loans of groups one and two. Likewise, 
T C13  = C31  is the covariance matrix between the loans of the first and third groups and 
T C23  = C32 is the covariance matrix between the loans of the second and third (see 
Appendix A). 
Table 6.2 shows the value of the loans of each segment, the corresponding HHI, and the associated 
capital allocation γi. 
 
Table 6.2 
Segment i  Vi  H(Fi)  γi  Ki 
1 $44,024  0.2613  0.3382  $20,293 
2 $43,186  0.2008  0.3318  $19,907 
3 $42,954  0.1293  0.33 $19,800 
 
                                                       
25  A1 is the first A-rated loan, C2 is the second C-rated loan and so on.  
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Refer to Appendix A for the variance covariance matrix used for this example. The Si matrices for 




















































































i  for all segments, since γi = Vi/V. 













Calculation of νi with 6.16, using a 5% confidence limit and assuming normality, yields: 
ν1 = $16,255 < K1 = $20,293, 
ν2 = $19,368 < K2 = $19,907, 
ν3 = $20,060 > K3 = $19,800. 
First note that: 






















Thus, the portfolio as a whole exhibits capital adequacy, in spite of the fact that the third segment does 
not comply with its individual capital requirement. This means that the segment will not satisfy any of 
the other conditions. Using the data in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the equivalent correlation for each segment 
is calculated from equation (6.13) and the risk concentration measure from (6.11). The results are 
summarised in Table 6.3: 
 
Table 6.3 
p  ρ  H(F)  H′  H′/H(F)  Loss std dev 
0.0774 0.1404 0.2613 0.365 1.3969  0.1614 
0.1162 0.1746 0.2008 0.3403 1.6947 0.1869 
0.1339 0.2792 0.1293 0.3724 2.8801 0.2078 
 
With these values, one can verify all the capital adequacy relations. As was to be expected, the third 
























i i F C F
V z
p
F H  
Now single obligor limits can be obtained: 
θ1 ≤ 1.1478 – 0.3895 = 0.7583;   f1 ≤ 0.7583 × $44,024 = $33,384 
θ2 ≤ 0.5314 – 0.2860 = 0.2454;   f2 ≤ 0.2454 × $43,186 = $10,596 
θ3 ≤ 0.2492 – 0.1377 = 0.1115;   f3 ≤ 0.1115 × $42,954 = $4,790  
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In summary, no loan in the first group exceeds its limit, while the $15,411 loan exceeds its limit in the 
second group. As was to be expected, the third group is the most problematic, since only the three 
smallest loans in the segment comply with the limit. 
Note that although the third segment is the least numerically concentrated as measured by H(F), it 
has the highest level of risk concentration H′. Although the first segment also exhibits high risk 
concentration, since it has the lowest average default probability it is the least risky of the three. Note 
also that the first is the numerically more concentrated segment, but since its equivalent correlation is 
relatively low, its risk concentration relative to its HHI is the smallest of the three. These numbers also 
illustrate the interplay between default probabilities and concentration in the loss variance of each 
segment, pointing to the third segment as the riskiest, because its equivalent correlation, risk 
concentration and average default probability are the largest of the three, providing the highest 
standard deviation of losses. 
The example evidences the analytical power of the model. If one had restricted the exercise to using 
the general model without analysing individual segments, the risky third segment would have passed 
undetected. It is also clear that the results depend on the segmentation criterion used, since one can 
classify the loans in such a way that all segments comply with the relevant relations, and risky groups 
of loans will remain undetected. However, the example also indicates how one can obtain insight into 
the ex ante concentration issue, in the worst case by trial and error. 
7.  Accounting for recovery rates 
It is simple to extend all the relations so far obtained to include loan recovery rates. Doing so leads to 
less restrictive limits in terms of tolerable concentration along the different dimensions where 
concentration can occur. Basically, there are two ways to account for recovery rates. The first is to 
define F directly as the vector of “loss given default” (LGD), as opposed to the outstanding balance, 
where it is assumed that nothing is recovered if loans default. This would be very much in line with 
current practice.
26 Thus if an estimation of the LGD vector is at hand, one can simply use this in the 
relations derived without any changes, although they should be reinterpreted accordingly. 
Alternatively, assuming that the portfolio is segmented such that recovery rates are the same for all 
loans in the group, let ri be the recovery rate for defaulted loans in segment i, so that the loss-given-
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and adding over all segments: 
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The expression shows that any change in recovery rates has a double impact. On the one hand, the 
importance of each segment’s correlation with loans of other segments is increased or decreased, 
depending on the ratio of loss rates between the loans in the segment with respect to that of the 
others. Additionally, its contribution to the expected loss also decreases (increases) in the numerator 
of the right-hand side, increasing (decreasing) the established bound on concentration. It is not difficult 
to show that the denominator of the right-hand side behaves accordingly, decreasing as the recovery 
rate increases and vice-versa. So, if recovery rate data is inadequate or non-existent, one can perform 
exercises using different recovery rates, or using some kind of reference. 
                                                       
26  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999).  
BIS Papers No 22  347
 
8.  The normality assumption 
Up to this point, it has been assumed that the loss distribution is normal. In this section we discuss the 
approximation of the loss distribution using a gamma distribution, which can also be characterised by 
its mean and variance and captures the asymmetry typically observed in credit loss distributions. The 
















The mean and the variance are E(x) = αβ and VAR(x) = αβ
2 respectively, and there is only one 
solution for any given pair of parameters (α, β). 
Several exercises have been performed to date, to compare the results of the model presented here 
and CreditRisk
+, on random portfolios from the SENICREB database of the central bank.
28 Without 
claiming to have conducted a rigorous and exhaustive study, we can say that the results obtained are 
encouraging. In the next example the results for the best and worst fits are shown. 
Example 8.1 
The results for the first exercise, Figure 8.1, compare the loss distributions obtained for a random 
portfolio of 3,000 loans in the SENICREB database. Whereas the normal approximation can differ with 
CreditRisk
+ as much as 37.7% in VaR at the 99% confidence level, the difference using the gamma 
approximation is only 0.45%. 
Figure 8.2 shows the results on a random portfolio of 1,320 loans from the same source. The loss 
distribution obtained using CreditRisk
+ has two “humps”. This is because this sample contained a very 
large loan in comparison with the other loans in the portfolio, which, due to the bucketing procedure 
required by CreditRisk
+, creates discontinuities and gaps in the possible losses. As shown in the table, 
the largest difference of VaR between the two methodologies using the gamma approximation is 
12.34% at the 99% confidence level. The figures using the normal approximation are worse. 
Figure 8.1 
Comparison of loss distributions on 
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27  There are many ways in which the gamma distribution can be written. The one adopted here follows the convention used in 
CreditRisk
+. 
28  SENICREB (Servicio Nacional de Información de Créditos Bancarios), is a loan database of the Mexican banking system, 
and is managed by the Bank of Mexico.  
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Table 8.1 
VaR comparative statistics for the sample 
VaR confidence 
level  0.95 0.975 0.99 0.995 
CR
+  1,878 2,212 2,623 2,932 
Normal 1,590  1,765  1,969  2,108 
Gamma 1,770  2,120  2,577  2,919 
 
Loss distribution 
statistics  Mean Variance  Std  dev  alfa  beta 
CR
+  673 312,277 559  –  – 
Normal  674 310,116 557  –  – 
Gamma  674 310,116 557  1.46 460.26 
 
Figure 8.2 
Comparison of loss distributions on  
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0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 2750 3000 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 2750 3000
CR+ Gamma Normal
Distribution VaR95 VaR97.5 VaR99 VaR99.5
CreditRisk+ 1606 1790 2030 2190 1606 1790 2030 2190
Gamma 1467 1618 1807 1942 1467 1618 1807 1942
Normal 1405 1509 1630 1712 1405 1509 1630 1712
 
It should be pointed out that not all of the exercises produced VaR differences where the model 
underestimated the results of CreditRisk
+. Some of the random portfolios provided results where the 
opposite occurred using the gamma approximation. In all of these cases the differences were small. 
It is not always the case that the VaR obtained by CyRCE is less than the corresponding VaR 
obtained using CreditRisk
+. Although the preceding examples are interesting and serve to illustrate the 
kind of results obtained by both methods, they are far from being a rigorous comparative study. In 
particular, it is interesting to examine how the two methodologies behave as the number of loans in the 
portfolio increases. In order to explore this behaviour, a simulation experiment was carried out, taking 
random samples of portfolios of increasing numbers of loans, and their VaR was calculated by both  
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methods, for different confidence levels.
29 The results of the exercise are summarised in Figure 8.3. 
The number of loans in the portfolios is shown on the x-axis, while the y-axis shows the average of the 
following statistic: 
portfolio   loan   of   value   Total
+ −
∆
CreditRisk CyRCE CaR VaR
 
The curves in the graph represent the average differences in VaR relative to the value of the portfolio, 
for different confidence levels. The gamma distribution was used for approximating the loss distribution 
obtained by CyRCE. 
Figure 8.3 
Comparison between CreditRisk
+ and CyRCE as  
the number of loans increases in the portfolio,  
for different confidence levels 




















First, it is interesting to note that the average difference of VaRs relative to the size of the portfolio 
decreases as the number of loans increases. This provides some empirical evidence that there is 
some sort of large numbers effect. Next, the graph shows that, on average, the VaR obtained by 
CyRCE overestimates that obtained by CreditRisk
+ for confidence levels below 98%, and 
underestimates them for higher confidence levels. Undoubtedly, this is due to the heavier tails of the 
loss distribution generated by CreditRisk
+. 
9.  Application of the model with limited portfolio information 
Any credit risk model requires two types of information: a description of the loans in the portfolio, and 
the default behaviour of the loans it contains (ie default probabilities and correlations). The model 
                                                       
29  Thus, for each of the 23 sizes of portfolio, between 2,000 and 64,000 loans, 500 simulation runs were performed. Due to the 
characteristics of the SENICREB database, sampling was done with replacement for the larger sizes.  
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presented here allows several options for performing calculations with limited information. Regardless 
of the quality of information available on default rates of loans in a portfolio, it is the author’s 
experience that in the worse case, bankers have some idea of what these are, even if this information 
is not available in some sort of systematised database. The estimation of default probabilities and 
correlations from default rates is a topic in itself and will not be dealt with here. On the other hand, the 
difficulty in obtaining portfolio information is of particular relevance to regulators, and probably 
constitutes the largest stumbling block for effective credit risk supervision. Banks are reluctant to 
provide regulators with this information on an ongoing basis simply because of the huge quantities of 
data involved. Even if the data could be obtained in an appropriate and systematic way, it would be 
difficult to handle. Private banks with large portfolios would also benefit from reducing information 
requirements to run their models. We now address this issue. 
As seen in the derivation of the model, it is not strictly necessary to know the credit portfolios in detail. 
Given an adequate segmentation of the portfolio, the only information required by the model is: 
a.  The total value of the loans in each segment Vi. 
b.  Enough information about the loan distribution within each segment, which allows an 
estimate of its HHI. 
c. Estimates  of  pi, ρi and ρij. 
In what follows, we will discuss how estimates of HHI can be obtained from some very basic statistics. 
Thus, suppose that the portfolio has been segmented into h segments. If for each segment one knows 








) ( = θ ≤   (9.1) 
Therefore, H(Fi) = θi, is an estimate of HHI for each segment, although perhaps somewhat crude. In 
fact, Theorem 5.3 can be used to obtain a slightly tighter bound. To see this, remember that the 
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∑fk = nθ + ε 
For this distribution, 
H(F) = nθ
2 + ε
2 = nθ ⋅ θ + ε
2 = (1 – ε)θ + ε
2. 
This expression is minimum when ε = 0.5θ. Since it is virtually impossible to have such a distribution in 
practice, if only the largest loan in each segment is known, one could argue that a good bound on HHI 
is: 
H(F) < θ(1 – 0.5θ)  (9.2) 
If the number of loans per segment Ni is known, as well as the average size loan  i f  and the variance 
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Note that (9.3) and (9.4) are exact values for the concentration indices, and that they can be obtained 
with very limited information. 
10.  Systemic credit risk analysis of the Mexican banking system 
Using the SENICREB database, the model is currently being used to analyse the credit risk profile and 
capital adequacy of the 20 banks of the Mexican financial system. The results are presented to the 
board of governors of the central bank on a monthly basis. In the exercise presented here for 
illustrative purposes, we assume that the underlying loss distribution is normal and VaR computations 
are for a monthly horizon at the 2.5% confidence level. Due to the centralisation that characterises the 
Mexican economy, it is difficult to segment by geographical region. As a starting point, the loan 
portfolio of the system has been segmented by bank and economic activity. Loans rated by one or 
more of the major rating agencies form a separate segment, because there are relatively few rated 
loans so the observed history of their default behaviour is insufficient for default probability and 
correlation estimation. Fortunately, the rating agencies themselves provide good estimates of these 
parameters. 
Figure 10.1 shows how the loan market was distributed among the major banks in Mexico at the end 
of March 2002. Two banks have 48% of the market, and 91% of all loans are held by seven banks. 
Figure 10.1 
Distribution of the loan portfolio by major banks 
March 2002 

































1  Millions of pesos. 
Figure 10.2 shows the distribution of the loan portfolio of the banking system segmented by economic 
activity. From the bar chart, we see that the largest segment is represented by mortgage and 
consumer loans, followed by financial services and so on.  
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Figure 10.2 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total loan portfolio: 343.357 million pesos 
 
1  Rated by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. 
Figure 10.3, shows the variation over time of VaR, default probabilities, HHI concentration index, 
covariation index and VaR relative to economic capital for the banking system. 
Figure 10.3 
































Mar  Jun  Sep Dec Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb  Mar 
2000  2001 2002 
p  1.2%  1.3%  1.3%  1.1% 1.1%  1.1%  1.1%  1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2%  1.2% 
IHH  1.1%  0.7%  0.7%  0.7% 0.6%  0.6%  0.7%  0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%  0.9% 
23% 
30% 
22%  25% 29%  28%  26%  27% 26% 28% 27%
21% 22% 20%
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This graph summarises how systemic VaR responds to the main risk drivers, and provides a first 
indication of how well the banking system is capitalised relative to the level of risk taken. 
Figure 10.4 shows the concentration of risk in the system. Banks are sorted by their contribution to the 
overall VaR of the system, and arranged from largest to smallest. A Lorenz curve is constructed so 
that the amount of risk concentrated in a specific number of banks can be seen. The bars represent 
the ratio of each bank’s VaR relative to its net capital. The horizontal line is the average VaR/net 
capital ratio for the system, so that one can see the relative position of each bank with respect to the 
system. Thus, 80% of the risk is concentrated in five banks and the third of these have a VaR/net 
capital ratio of 64%, which is relatively high when compared to the 23% average of the system. 
Figure 10.4 
Individual banks’ contribution to systemic risk 
March 2002 
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Contribution to systemic risk by economic activity 
March 2002 
  VaR95/System VaR VaR95 accumulated 
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Figure 10.5, shows the contribution of the individual segments of economic activity. Most of the risk is 
in consumer and mortgage loans, followed by financial services. Note that construction and 
communications and transportation have moved up to third and fourth place respectively, from the fifth 
and sixth positions they occupy in terms of loan value. This is due to relatively high concentration and 
default probabilities within these sectors. Note also how the food industry, which is in the eighth 
position in terms of loan value, occupies the 13th slot in terms of risk. 
Figures 10.6 to 10.8 provide some statistical results on the behaviour of the credit risk driver, ie default 
probabilities, concentration and loss variation-covariation indices, for all banks and segments 
considered. 
Figure 10.6 
Default probability histogram 
April 2001-March 2002 
 

































































































































Herfindahl-Hirschman index histogram 
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Figure 10.8 
Loss variance-covariance index histogram 








































































































Figure 10.9 is a histogram of how well banks are capitalised as measured by the capital adequacy 
relationship. On average, the excess of net capital over VaR as a proportion of the value of the 
portfolios is around 25%, and in the past two years no negative quantities have been observed. 
Figure 10.9 
Capital adequacy histogram (EC – VaR95)/loan portfolio value > 0 
April 2001-March 2002 
 












































































































Figure 10.10 shows the analysis of compliance with the theoretical single obligor limits. Among the five 
banks that account for 80% of the risk of the system, only the three shown in the graph have loans that 
exceed the limit. Bank number two of this graph, which is the same as bank number three of 
Figure 10.5, has many such loans. Analysis of the bank’s risk revealed that the large VaR/EC ratio is 
due to some extent to concentration. However, it should be emphasised that the limit is only a 
sufficient condition for capital adequacy but not a necessary one. So even if it helps to know how 
many and which loans are in violation of the condition, further analysis is needed in order to assess 
the gravity of the situation.  
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Figure 10.10 























































































These graphs give a good idea of the type of analysis that is possible using the model. The same 
amount of detail is obtained for every bank in the system, permitting a more in-depth analysis of their 
situation. 
11. Concluding  remarks 
The results obtained are very appealing for managing credit risk, since they provide explicit formulae 
to measure risk and permit a precise quantification of the policy actions that should be adopted in 
order to maintain capital adequacy. If default or recovery rates change, or concentration along a 
particular segment is excessive, the relations can be used to determine the adjustments to the 
capitalisation ratio and/or concentration composition of the portfolio that would re-establish capital 
adequacy. If banks have control over default or recovery rates to some degree, these can be part of 
the management instruments that can be used to maintain capital adequacy. 
Since single obligor limits and the HHI are related to concentration, and since the measures are 
subject to the same bound, either one can be used as a policy instrument. In fact, both measures can 
be used in conjunction. Whereas the single obligor limit is easy to implement and supervise, it may 
lead to overly constrained loan distributions. For example, if a greedy bank manager decides to grant 
a loan exceeding his limit, the gravity of the transgression may be assessed using the HHI. It may be 
that, apart from misbehaviour, the infraction is not serious in terms of risk. 
It is clear that default probability distributions as well as recovery rates exhibit random behaviours 
through time, depending on economic and financial factors. In contrast to market risk, where risk 
factors can be modelled using continuous processes, because loan defaults are discrete events in 
time, default behaviour in a certain group can also change in pronounced discrete jumps. This is one 
reason why it is difficult to establish ex ante concentration. Under different economic conditions, 
default probabilities and correlations can increase for a certain group of debtors, which otherwise 
appeared to be unrelated (eg mortgage loans to employees of a large company that goes bankrupt). 
Since the model can handle arbitrary segmentations of the portfolio, and it is relatively simple to stress 
particular segments and analyse the consequences, it provides a means for detecting ex ante 
concentration. 
There is no reason why default probabilities cannot be made to depend on risk factors and credit 
drivers through logit models as in Credit Portfolio View, or as linear combinations of these factors.  
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Since these are determined exogenously, the results can be embedded in simulation models which 
generate scenarios of trajectories of these variables through time that exhibit the discontinuities typical 
of default-related events. From these, one can obtain stressed loss distributions and all the related 
statistics for each segment and the portfolio. This type of experiment may be what is needed to set an 
appropriate policy on the capitalisation ratio and single obligor limits. Note that since the simulation 
process in this case is for only a few variables, it can be done very efficiently. 
Whatever the dynamics, it is always possible to make the necessary adjustments through time by 
monitoring only a few variables.  
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1  0.0162 0.0050 0.0050 0.0060 0.0060 0.0082 0.0082 0.0105 
2 0.0050  0.0475 0.0086 0.0103 0.0103 0.0140 0.0140 0.0180 
3 0.0050  0.0086  0.0475 0.0103 0.0103 0.0140 0.0140 0.0180 
4  0.0060 0.0103 0.0103 0.0694 0.0125 0.0169 0.0169 0.0217 
5  0.0060 0.0103 0.0103 0.0125 0.0694 0.0169 0.0169 0.0217 
6  0.0082 0.0140 0.0140 0.0169 0.0169 0.1275 0.0230 0.0295 
7  0.0082 0.0140 0.0140 0.0169 0.0169 0.0230 0.1275 0.0295 




21 12 C C
T =  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9  0.0063 0.0108 0.0108 0.0130 0.0130 0.0177 0.0177 0.0227 
10  0.0081 0.0138 0.0138 0.0166 0.0166 0.0226 0.0226 0.0290 
11  0.0081 0.0138 0.0138 0.0166 0.0166 0.0226 0.0226 0.0290 
12  0.0111 0.0190 0.0190 0.0229 0.0229 0.0311 0.0311 0.0399 
13  0.0111 0.0190 0.0190 0.0229 0.0229 0.0311 0.0311 0.0399 
14  0.0132 0.0226 0.0226 0.0273 0.0273 0.0370 0.0370 0.0475 
15  0.0169 0.0290 0.0290 0.0350 0.0350 0.0475 0.0475 0.0609 




31 13 C C
T =  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
17  0.0039 0.0067 0.0067 0.0081 0.0081 0.0109 0.0109 0.0140 
18  0.0052 0.0089 0.0089 0.0108 0.0108 0.0146 0.0146 0.0188 
19  0.0067 0.0114 0.0114 0.0138 0.0138 0.0187 0.0187 0.0240 
20  0.0081 0.0138 0.0138 0.0167 0.0167 0.0226 0.0226 0.0290 
21  0.0092 0.0157 0.0157 0.0190 0.0190 0.0257 0.0257 0.0330 
22  0.0109 0.0187 0.0187 0.0226 0.0226 0.0306 0.0306 0.0393 
23  0.0140 0.0240 0.0240 0.0290 0.0290 0.0393 0.0393 0.0504 
24  0.0140 0.0240 0.0240 0.0290 0.0290 0.0393 0.0393 0.0504 
25  0.0140 0.0240 0.0240 0.0290 0.0290 0.0393 0.0393 0.0504 
  




  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
9  0.0291 0.0086 0.0086 0.0118 0.0118 0.0140 0.0180 0.0180 
10 0.0086  0.0475 0.0109 0.0150 0.0150 0.0179 0.0230 0.0230 
11 0.0086  0.0109  0.0475 0.0150 0.0150 0.0179 0.0230 0.0230 
12  0.0118 0.0150 0.0150 0.0900 0.0207 0.0246 0.0316 0.0316 
13  0.0118 0.0150 0.0150 0.0207 0.0900 0.0246 0.0316 0.0316 
14  0.0140 0.0179 0.0179 0.0246 0.0246 0.1275 0.0376 0.0376 
15  0.0180 0.0230 0.0230 0.0316 0.0316 0.0376 0.2100 0.0483 





23 32 C C
T =  
  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
9  0.0070 0.0093 0.0119 0.0144 0.0164 0.0195 0.0250 0.0250 0.0250 
10  0.0089 0.0119 0.0152 0.0184 0.0209 0.0249 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 
11  0.0089 0.0119 0.0152 0.0184 0.0209 0.0249 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 
12  0.0122 0.0164 0.0209 0.0253 0.0288 0.0343 0.0440 0.0440 0.0440 
13  0.0122 0.0164 0.0209 0.0253 0.0288 0.0343 0.0440 0.0440 0.0440 
14  0.0146 0.0195 0.0249 0.0301 0.0343 0.0408 0.0524 0.0524 0.0524 
15  0.0187 0.0250 0.0320 0.0386 0.0440 0.0524 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 






  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
17  0.0162 0.0093 0.0119 0.0144 0.0164 0.0196 0.0251 0.0251 0.0251 
18 0.0093  0.0291 0.0160 0.0193 0.0220 0.0262 0.0336 0.0336 0.0336 
19 0.0119  0.0160  0.0475 0.0247 0.0281 0.0335 0.0429 0.0429 0.0429 
20  0.0144 0.0193 0.0247 0.0694 0.0340 0.0404 0.0519 0.0519 0.0519 
21  0.0164 0.0220 0.0281 0.0340 0.0900 0.0461 0.0591 0.0591 0.0591 
22  0.0196 0.0262 0.0335 0.0404 0.0461 0.1275 0.0704 0.0704 0.0704 
23  0.0251 0.0336 0.0429 0.0519 0.0591 0.0704 0.2100 0.0903 0.0903 
24  0.0251 0.0336 0.0429 0.0519 0.0591 0.0704 0.0903 0.2100 0.0903 
25  0.0251 0.0336 0.0429 0.0519 0.0591 0.0704 0.0903 0.0903 0.2100  
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